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I. Introduction
Private antitrust actions frequently involve protracted pretrial
proceedings and lengthy trials, the litigation and outcome of which
invariably have a significant impact on the parties and their coun-
sel. A victorious plaintiff will have convinced the fact finder that
the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct causing injury
to plaintiff's business and often resulting in substantial damages.
A prevailing defendant will have vindicated its business practices,
perhaps preserving or enhancing its market position. Both
plaintiff's and defendant's counsel will share in the result-cer-
tainly, for both sides, professionally and, assuming a contingent-
fee arrangement, on plaintiff's side, financially.
However, for most antitrust litigants and their counsel, the
jury's verdict signals that the game is, at best, half over. Post-trial
motions invariably follow. Those motions may address a number
of issues, including testing the validity of the jury's verdict, recon-
ciling prior settlements and judgments in the case, and resolving
the issue of which party should ultimately bear the expense of the
litigation.
This Article will discuss post-trial motion practice in private
antitrust actions brought in federal court. It is designed to provide
the antitrust lawyer with a practical guide to identifying and brief-
ing recurring issues in post-trial motion practice. While the law
concerning many of these motions has developed in both antitrust
and non-antitrust contexts, where available, annotations have been
drawn from antitrust case law. Those motions and issues unique
to antitrust practice will, of course, be highlighted.
Because certain post-trial motions may only be raised by a
prevailing antitrust plaintiff or counterclaimant, this Article will
first discuss motions affecting the jury's determination of the
prevailing party, including motions to poll the jury, for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), and for new trial. A discus-
sion of motions affecting the amount of the judgment, including
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motions for set-off of prior settlements and for grant of interest
and applications for attorney's fees and costs, will follow.
II. Motions Affecting the Jury's Determination
A. Motion to Poll Jury
Although not specifically codified, it has long been settled that
a party in a civil action, including a private antitrust action, may
demand a poll of the jury after the verdict has been announced
but before it has been recorded.' The purpose underlying the poll-
ing procedure
is to give each juror an opportunity, before the verdict is
recorded, to declare in open court his assent to the verdict
which the foreman has returned and thus to enable the court
and the parties to ascertain with certainty that a unanimous ver-
dict has in fact been reached and that no juror has been coerced
or induced to agree to a verdict to which he has not fully as-
sented.2
If, upon polling, a juror dissents, the court may either order a
mistrial3 or return the jury for further deliberations
Given the complexity of law and proof in most antitrust ac-
tions and given the high stakes involved in any action for treble
damages, a party suffering an adverse verdict should, as a matter
of course, demand a poll of the jury in a timely fashion. In the
unlikely event that a juror dissents, the party receiving the dissent-
ing vote will usually prefer a mistrial to further jury deliberation.!
However, assuming the jury is not hopelessly deadlocked, the most
judicially and financially economical practice would be to return
the jurors for further deliberations.
1. Humphries v. District of Columbia, 174 U.S. 190, 194 (1899); Hausrath v. New
York Cent. R.R. Co., 401 F.2d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 1968); Pessin v. Keeneland Ass'n, 298
F. Supp. 593, 596 (E.D. Ky. 1969); cf. FED. R. CRiM. P. 31(d) ("When a verdict is returned
and before it is recorded the jury shall be polled at the request of any party or upon the
Court's own motion.").
2. Virgin Islands v. Hercules, 875 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Miranda
v. United States, 255 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1958)); see also Pessin, 298 F. Supp. at 596.
3. Curry v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 51 F.R.D. 301, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Finn
v. Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp., 68 F. Supp. 423, 429 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
4. Castleberry v. NRM Corp., 470 F.2d 1113, 1117 (10th Cir. 1972); Bruce v.
Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 126 F.2d 224, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
5. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 9 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2504 at 490 (1971).
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B. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
1. Rule 50(b).-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) permits
a party who has moved for a directed verdict at the close of all of
the evidence to move, no more than ten days after entry of judgment
or within ten days after the jury is discharged if no verdict was
returned, to set aside the verdict and judgment and have judgment
entered in accordance with its motion for directed verdict.6
As discussed below,7 Rule 50(b) and the general law
developed in connection with motions for JNOV have been applied
to a variety of antitrust actions.
2. Necessity of Motion for Directed Verdict.-Generally, a mo-
tion for JNOV will not be entertained if the party making it has
not made a motion for directed verdict at the close of all of the
evidence8 or has failed to include the specific grounds for its JNOV
motion in its motion for directed verdict." Thus, if a party moves
for a directed verdict after the opposing party has presented its
evidence but fails to renew the motion at the close of all the
evidence, the party may not thereafter move for JNOV.Y The pur-
pose of this strict requirement is to alert the opposing party to the
alleged insufficiency of the evidence at a point in the trial when
the party may" still cure the defect by presenting further evidence."
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all -the evidence
is denied or for any reason is not granted, the Court is deemed to have submitted
the action to the jury subject to a later determination of the legal questions raised
by the motion. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with the
party's motion for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned such party,
within 10 days after the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with the party's motion for a directed verdict.
7. See infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
8. Wells Real Estate v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 810 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 (1988); Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1985); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 452 F.2d 124, 127
(8th Cir. 1971).
9. Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 813-15 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 980 (1986); see also Hilord Chem. Corp. v. Ricoh Elec.,
Inc., 875 F.2d 32, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1989).
10. Farley Transp., 786 F.2d at 1345.
11. Id. at 1346; Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy, Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 825 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979).
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Various exceptions have tempered the harshness of the general
rule. First, some courts take a liberal view of what constitutes a
sufficient motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence
and would hear JNOV motions after inartfully made or ambiguous-
ly stated motions for directed verdict or after objections to jury
instructions. 2 Other courts would allow JNOV motions when the
evidence following a party's unrenewed motion for directed verdict
was brief and would not possibly have changed the court's original
ruling. 3 At least one court has made an exception where the trial
judge takes the original directed verdict motion under advisement,
reasoning that the court's reservation of a ruling maintains the mo-
tion as a continuing objection to the sufficiency of the evidence
and that the requirement should not be enforced unless the oppos-
ing party has suffered prejudice from the moving party's failure
to renew the motion.'4
Notwithstanding these exceptions, to clearly establish its right
to move for JNOV a party in an antitrust action should always
renew its motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence.
3. Standard/Grounds for Grant or Denial.--in civil actions
generally and antitrust actions specifically, the standard applicable
to a JNOV motion is whether the evidence and its inferences, taken
as a whole and viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, are sufficiently substantial to support the jury's verdict."
Thus, JNOV will only be warranted where the evidence supports
but one conclusion: No reasonable jury could have found against
the moving party. 6 In antitrust actions where the evidence is en-
12. Farley Transp., 786 F.2d at 1347; Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brook-
haven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1976).
13. Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 823 (2d Cir. 1984); Wells Real Estate
v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 810 n.7 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 955 (1988). But cf. Coker v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1437 (1 1th Cir. 1983).
14. McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1389 (7th Cir. 1984).
15. General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 1987)
(denial of motion for JNOV must be affirmed "unless the record taken as a whole lacks
any evidence to support the jury's verdict"); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITr
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1026 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825
(1982); see also A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 680,
686 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (evidence must be substantial; a mere scintilla will not suffice),
affid, 881 F.2d 1396 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1326 (1990).
16. The Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 F.2d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 1988);
Kelco Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 845 F.2d 404, 407 (2d Cir. 1988), aff d,
109 S. Ct. 2909 (1989).
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tirely circumstantial, the court must decide whether a reasonable
jury "could reach the suggested conclusion on the basis of the hard
evidence without resorting to guesswork or conjecture."' 7 Irrespec-
tive of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, neither the
district court nor the court of appeals may judge the credibility of
witnesses or substitute their judgment for that of the jury, provided
that substantial evidence supports the verdict. 8 Courts have defined
substantial evidence as more than a scintilla; it is such relevant
evidence that a reasonable juror might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.'9
4. Motion for JNOV in Antitrust Actions.-Notwithstanding
the deferential standard toward jury verdicts, motions for JNOV
have been granted on both liability and damages issues in a variety
of antitrust actions. Although the following is by no means an
exhaustive list, courts have granted JNOV as to liability where
plaintiffs have failed to prove the following elements of their an-
titrust claims: an impact on interstate commerce in conspiracy to
monopolize and attempt to monopolize claims," abuse of monopoly
power in a monopolization claim,2' the relevant market or monopoly
power in monopolization claims,22 dangerous probability of success
in an attempt to monopolize claim, 3 a horizontal price fixing con-
spiracy in a restraint of trade claim,24 price discrimination and an
ability to recoup a predatory investment in a Robinson-Patman
17. The Jeanery, 849 F.2d at 1151 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons v. Texaco,
Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 116 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
18. William Inglis & Sons, 668 F.2d at 1026; A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc., 683 F. Supp.
at 686; International Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 710, 718-19
(D.S.C. 1984), affd, 792 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1986).
19. Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1213 (1985); A.A. Poultry Farms, 683 F. Supp. at 686.
20. Ford Wholesale Co. v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1204, 1205 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 876 (1974).
21. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 383 (7th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987).
22. Dimmitt Agri Indus. v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 679 F.2d 516, 531 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983); Fount-Wip, Inc. v. Reddi-Wip, Inc., 568 F.2d 1296, 1301-
02 (9th Cir. 1978).
23. International Distrib. Centers v. Walsh Trucking, 812 F.2d 786, 790-93 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987).
24. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 524-28 (9th Cir. 1987).
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claim,25 and antitrust injury and damages, i.e., injury to competition,
not merely injury to competitors, in a restraint of trade claim. 6 As
to damages, courts have granted JNOV where plaintiffs failed to
present sufficient evidence or offer a rational estimation of antitrust
damages.27
Thus, while the standard for JNOV is deferential, as it should
be, to the jury's verdict, JNOV motions are routinely made and
frequently granted in private antitrust actions. JNOV motions
should be made whenever the plaintiff fails to meet the exacting
liability requirements of the antitrust laws-such as where a plain-
tiff proves, at most, liability under a state law tort theory but fails
to prove market power or injury to competition-or where a jury
awards damages in excess of those proven at trial.
C. Motion for New Trial
1. Rule 59.-Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, a party
or the court on its own initiative may move for a new trial within
ten days after entry of judgment. 8  A motion for a new trial is
addressed to the sound discretion of the district court.29 While the
25. A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1403, 1406-08
(7th Cir. 1989).
26. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-90 (1977).
27. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. Western Union Tel., 797 F.2d 370, 381-83 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934 (1987); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 658 F.2d
1256, 1260-63 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1018 (1982).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 59 provides in pertinent part:
(a) A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for
any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions
at law in the courts of the United States; and (2) in an action tried without a
jury, for any of the reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted
in suits in equity in the courts of the United States.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the
entry of the judgment.
(d) Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own in-
itiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a
new trial on motion of a party. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity
to be heard on the matter, a court may grant a motion for a new trial, timely
served, for a reason not stated in the motion. In either case, the court shall
specify in the order the grounds therefor.
29. Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 440 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam); Wells
Real Estate v. Greater Lowell Bd. of Realtors, 850 F.2d 803, 810 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
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specific grounds for granting or denying the motion will be dis-
cussed infra," the court's ruling will usually be guided by the in-
terests of justice."
2. Joinder with Motion for JNOV.-Under Rule 50(b), "[a]
motion for a new trial may be joined with [a motion for JNOV],
or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative."32 Under Rule
50(c)(1), the district court must rule on both motions.3
The Rule 50(b) joinder provision benefits the party who suf-
fers an adverse jury verdict. If the verdict is not supported by
substantial evidence (the standard for ruling on a motion for
JNOV), then by definition the verdict must also be against the
weight of the evidence. The joinder provision allows the district
court to grant JNOV under the more stringent evidentiary standard
and, alternatively, determine that a new trial is appropriate if its
JNOV is reversed. If an appellate court does reverse the JNOV
but finds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, it
need not reinstate the jury verdict but may instead grant a new
trial. Moreover, where a party has lost its right to move for JNOV
by failing to renew its motion for directed verdict at the close of
the evidence, an alternative motion for new trial will provide the
district court an opportunity to order a new trial and avoid entering
judgment on the jury's verdict.
3. Standard/Grounds for Determination.-Rule 59(a) is
broadly written and does not specify any particular grounds for
granting or denying a motion for new trial.34 Overall, however, the
new trial standard is less stringent than the substantial evidence
standard applied to motions for JNOV.35 In ruling on motions for
488 U.S. 955 (1988); Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc. of New Mexico, 703 F.2d 1197,
1211 (10th Cir. 1983).
30. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
31. Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 806-07 n.ll (7th
Cir. 1980); Pitts v. Electro-Static Furnishing, 607 F.2d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 1979).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b).
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(1) provides in pertinent part:
If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.., is granted, the court
shall also rule on the motion for a new trial, if any, by determining whether it
should be granted if the judgment is thereafter vacated or reversed, and shall
specify the grounds for granting or denying the motion for the new trial.
34. See supra note 28.
35. Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 1188 n.1 (9th Cir. 1984).
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new trial, most courts have focused on two distinct criteria: (1) the
amount and nature of proof presented at trial and (2) the fairness
of the proceedings. Applying the first criterion, courts may grant
a new trial if the jury's liability verdict was against the weight of
the evidence. 6 Courts have not only focused on proof of liability
but have also evaluated whether the damages awarded were exces-
sive or not supported by the evidence.37
Applying the second criterion, courts have awarded new trials
to avoid a "miscarriage of justice."38 Courts may grant a new trial
if there has been misconduct by the court or counsel,39 if there has
been misconduct in the jury's deliberations or decision,4° or if the
damage award is fueled by passion and prejudice and shocks the
conscience.4" Finally, as a subcategory of the fairness criterion, a
new trial may be ordered in cases involving newly discovered
evidence.42
4. Partial New Trial.-Rule 59(a) states that a new trial may
be granted "on all or part of the issues,"43 thereby allowing the
district court to grant a partial new trial. Where an error is made
at trial on a discrete issue and the error does not taint the jury's
determination of other issues, a new trial may be ordered on that
single issue."
36. City of Malden v. Union Elec. Co., 887 F.2d 157, 161 (8th Cir. 1989); William
Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir.
1982).
37. Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1988);
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 791 F.2d 1356,
1360, 1365-67 (9th Cir. 1986); Segal v. Gilbert Color Sys., 746 F.2d 78, 80-81 (1st Cir.
1984).
38. Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 (9th Cir. 1976); Simpson v. Skelly
Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 570 (8th Cir. 1967); Tann v. Service Distrib., 56 F.R.D. 593, 598
(D. Pa. 1972), affid, 481 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1973).
39. DeRance, Inc. v. PaineWebber, 872 F.2d 1312, 1327 (7th Cir. 1989); Simpson
v. City of Maple Heights, 720 F. Supp. 1306, 1308-10 (N.D. Ohio 1989).
40. McCoy v. Goldston. 652 F.2d 654, 659 (6th Cir. 1981); Davison v. Monessen
S.W. Ry. Co., 144 F. Supp. 599, 600 (D. Pa. 1956).
41. Tann, 56 F.R.D. at 598; Graling v. Reilly, 214 F. Supp. 234, 235 (D.D.C. 1963).
42. National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Comm. of the President's Private
Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D. Cir. 1983); Strobl v. New York
Mercantile Exch., 590 F. Supp. 875, 878 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
43. FE. R. Civ. P. 59(a); see supra note 28.
44. Eximco, Inc. v. Trane Co., 737 F.2d 505, 513 (5th Cir. 1984); Devine v. Patteson,
242 F.2d 828, 832 (6th Cir. 1957).
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Partial new trials frequently involve jury damage awards.
Thus, where liability has been properly determined, a district court
may grant a new trial limited to the issue of damages if that issue
is not so interwoven with the liability question that the damage
issue cannot be submitted to a new jury without causing confusion
or uncertainty, thereby denying a fair trial.4"
Numerous courts have ordered or approved the grant of a new
trial limited to the issue of damages in antitrust actions.46 In MCI
Communications v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,47 an an-
titrust action alleging, inter alia, predatory pricing, the court of
appeals affirmed the jury's finding that AT&T had monopolized
the telephone interconnection industry.48 However, because the
jury had awarded damages for certain conduct that was not un-
lawful under the antitrust laws, the court of appeals ordered a new
trial restricted to the issue of damages.49 In so holding, the court
indicated that a separate trial on the damages issue was "an effec-
tive method of simplifying factual presentation, reducing cost, and
saving time."5 The court further noted that plaintiff MCI's proof
of damages was distinct from its proof on liability and that "[to
the extent that it is necessary to educate the fact finder . .. ,
evidence which might normally be associated with the determina-
tion of liability may have to be introduced or reintroduced."'"
In antitrust actions where the only real dispute is damages, a
partial new trial may be an attractive alternative to both the parties
and the court. Assuming a new trial will be ordered, a plaintiff
will usually favor a new trial limited to damages, because it will
allow the plaintiff to retain its liability verdict and avoid reproving
that issue. A defendant, while preferring a second crack at dis-
45. Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1931);
Digidyne Corp. v..Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1347 (9th Cir. 1984).
46. Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1988);
Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985);
Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1347; MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
708 F.2d 1081, 1166-67 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 305 (2d Cir. 1979).
47. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
48. Id. at 1174.
49. Id. at 1166-68.
50. Id. at 1167.
51. Id. at 1168.
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proving liability, may also benefit from a partial new trial on
damages by convincing the court to exclude, on relevance grounds,
inflammatory liability evidence that may have caused the jury to
award the excessive damages in the first instance. Finally, the
court may favor a partial new trial limited to damages because it
will frequently eliminate the need for time-consuming evidence
relating solely to liability and thereby streamline the subsequent
trial.
III. Motions Affecting the Amount of the Judgment
A. Motion for Remittitur in Lieu of New Trial
It has long been settled that where the trial court determines
that a damage award is excessive, but not the result of passion or
prejudice, the court may either grant a motion for new trial or deny
the motion conditioned upon the prevailing party's accepting a
remittitur.52 In effect, the prevailing party must choose to either
submit to a new trial or accept a reduced amount of damages that
the court considers justified.53
Courts have followed a variety of standards in determining the
amount that should be remitted from an excessive verdict. Some
courts have reduced an excessive verdict to the minimum amount
a jury could properly award on the theory that any greater sum
would deprive a defendant of its right to a jury determination on
the damages ultimately awarded. 4 Other courts, disdaining any
precise standard, have reduced an excessive verdict to whatever
amount the court itself believed a jury could properly have
awarded. 5 Still other courts, reasoning that a jury intended to
52. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 65-66 (1966); Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 483-85 (1935); Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. v.
Moguin, 283 U.S. 520, 521 (1931); Seymour v. Summa Vista Cinema, 809 F.2d 1385.
1387 (9th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 817 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. Fenner v. Dependable Trucking Co., 716 F.2d 598, 603 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing
Minthorne v. Seeburg Corp., 397 F.2d 237, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1036 (1970)); Korotki v. Goughan, 597 F. Supp. 1365, 1385-86 (D. Md. 1984).
54. See, e.g., Meissner v. Papas, 35 F. Supp. 676, 677 (E.D. Wis. 1940), affd, 124
F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1941).
55. See Lanfranconi v. Tidewater Oil Co., 376 F.2d 91 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 951 (1967); Meehan v. Central R.R. Co. of N.J., 181 F. Supp. 594, 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
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award the maximum amount possible, have held that an excessive
verdict must be remitted to the maximum amount sustained by the
evidence. 6 The "maximum recovery rule" would appear to be the
only rule consistent with the plaintiff's right to trial by jury under
the seventh amendment. 7 The standard that the court chooses is
critical, for a prevailing party who accepts a remittitur, even under
protest, cannot appeal the propriety of the original remittitur
order. 8
The availability of remittitur in an antitrust action is especially
important to a defendant, because every dollar reduced from an
antitrust verdict reduces the ultimate judgment by three dollars. A
prevailing antitrust plaintiff may likewise benefit from the remit-
titur procedure, because it may constitute an acceptable com-
promise between the trial court sustaining a substantial verdict that
it does not believe was completely supported by the evidence and
ordering a new trial, thereby depriving the plaintiff of its monetary
award and further burdening the court's calendar.
B. Motion for Set-Off as a Result of Settling Defendant
Frequently, in multi-defendant antitrust actions, a plaintiff will
settle with one or more defendants before trial. An issue may
arise as to whether, and under what circumstances, the amount
received in settlement should be set off from the amount a plaintiff
recovers at trial.
A set-off for settlement is an equitable measure designed to
avoid double recovery. 9 It is well-settled in antitrust conspiracy
actions that the amount of any settlement should be set off against
56. See, e.g., Peters v. T. G. & Y. Stores Co., 707 F.2d 227, 230 (5th Cir. 1983);
D & S Redi-Mix v. Sierra Redi-Mix, 692 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1982).
57. Community Television Serv. v. Dresser Indus., 435 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D.S.D.
1977), affd, 586 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979); Call Carl,
Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 578 (D. Md. 1975), aff d in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
58. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 650 (1977) (per curiam); 999 v.
C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866, 873 (9th Cir. 1985); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Sealy,
Inc., 585 F.2d 821, 840 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979). A plaintiff
may, however, appeal from those parts of the judgment separate and distinct from the
remittitur. Denholm v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 912 F.2d 357, 359-61 (9th Cir. 1990);
Lanier v. Sallas, 777 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1985).
59. Convoy Corp. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 601 F.2d 385, 388 (9th Cir. 1979).
[Vol. 10:25
PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
any damage award assessed against the remaining defendants at
trial.' This rule is both logical and fair in a conspiracy case, be-
cause a defendant is jointly and severally liable for all damages
caused by its coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.6'
Thus, provided the jury has been instructed to assess the remaining
defendant with all damages caused by its coconspirators' anticom-
petitive conduct, a set-off properly prevents a prevailing plaintiff
from receiving a windfall.
However, in nonconspiracy cases involving multiple defen-
dants, i.e., in cases in which the defendants are not jointly and
severally liable, several courts have indicated that a set-off of a
prior settlement "would not normally be permitted."62 This rule is
based on the equitable principle that "where two or more defen-
dants are responsible for separate injuries, an amount received in
settlement from one defendant for one of the injuries may not be
used to reduce the liability of the other defendant for the other
injury."" While ruling in the "non-set-off' context, courts of ap-
peals have increasingly required that juries assess damages only
for injuries caused by the anticompetitive conduct of a particular
defendant and not for injuries resulting from other causes.' As-
suming the jury is so instructed where one or more defendants
have settled before trial, the jury must be presumed to have
awarded only those damages proximately caused by the remaining
defendant.65 Under these circumstances, any set-off of the settle-
60. New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d 1065, 1086 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 848 (1988); Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 530 F.2d 529, 534 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); see also Singer v. Olympia Brewing Co., 878
F,2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 729 (1990).
61. In re Cement and Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); In
re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1257 (7th Cir. 1980).
62. U.S. Indus. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1235 n.17 (10th Cir. 1988)
(citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 267 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 952 (1958)).
63. U.S. Indus., 854 F.2d at 1236; Hess Oil Virgin Island Corp. v. UOP, Inc., 861
F.2d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 1988).
64. See, e.g., United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d
1335, 1378-79 (2d Cir. 1988); Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786
F.2d 1342, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985); MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1161-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
65. See generally Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d
13, 27 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1066 (1987) ("juries are presumed to follow
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ment amount would deprive a prevailing plaintiff of full recovery
and grant a windfall to the remaining defendant. Thus, while set-
off may be appropriate in antitrust conspiracy cases, set-off
generally will not be appropriate in nonconspiracy cases involving
multiple defendants.
Assuming a set-off is appropriate, should the set-off be taken
before or after the verdict is trebled? Since the Ninth Circuit's
seminal decision in Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord,66 courts have consis-
tently deducted settlement proceeds after trebling.67 One court has
succinctly stated three reasons for the Flintkote rule:
First, the antitrust laws provide that the plaintiff should receive
three times the proven actual damages. If settlement proceeds
are deducted before trebling, the plaintiff's total award is less
than what the law allows. Since antitrust defendants are joint
tortfeasors, each is liable to complete the total deserved
damages irrespective of fault. Second, one purpose of the treb-
ling provision is to encourage private plaintiffs to bring suit.
Any ultimate recovery totaling less than three times proven
damages would weaken the statutory incentive through judicial
construction. Third, deduction of settlement proceeds before
trebling would discourage settlement by making litigation rela-
tively more profitable for plaintiffs: every dollar received in
settlement would cause a three-dollar reduction in the judgment
at trial.6"
Thus, while the right to set off may depend on whether the action
involves a single injury and joint and several liability or separate
injuries and concurrent liability, any proper set-off must be taken
after trebling the damage award.
instructions"); United States v. Jones, 425 F.2d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 823 (1970).
66. 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
67. See, e.g., Sciambra v. Graham News Co., 841 F.2d 651, 657 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 855 (1988); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d 1065, 1086 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d
380, 392-94 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); Hydrolevel Corp. v.
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118, 130 (2d Cir. 1980), affd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 556 (1982); Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, 530 F.2d 529, 534 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Semke v. Enid Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 320 F. Supp.
445, 446-47 (W.D. Okla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 456 F.2d 1361, 1371 (10th Cir.
1972); Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708, 715-16
(N.D. Cal. 1962).
68. Hydrolevel Corp., 635 F.2d at 130.
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C. Motion for Grant of Interest
1. Prejudgment Interest.-Before 1980, the Clayton Act did
not address prejudgment interest in private treble damage actions.
Relying on this congressional silence and reasoning that the treble
damage provision provided sufficient relief, most courts refused to
award prejudgment interest on federal antitrust claims.69 In 1980,
Congress amended the Clayton Act to authorize the award of
prejudgment interest in appropriate cases." The amended statute
emphasized that the potential award of prejudgment interest is
designed to discourage litigants from using delay tactics.7 One
court, perhaps stating the obvious, has held that the jury's ultimate
finding against the defendant does not alone establish facts suffi-
cient to justify an award of prejudgment interest.72 Thus, while
69. See Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 638 F.2d 661, 663 (3d Cir.
1981); HeatTransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964, 986-87 n.20 (5th
Cir. 1977); Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 80 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on
other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973); Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corp., 429 F.2d 873, 877
(7th Cir. 1970); Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 1266, 1275 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff d in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But
cf. Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 F. Supp. 1276, 1289 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other
grounds, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Jetco Auto Serv., 1980-81 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,806 at 78,315 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
70. The Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1980) provides:
(a) The court may award under this section, pursuant to a motion promptly made,
simple interest on actual damages for the period beginning on the date of
service of such person's pleading setting forth the claim under the antitrust
laws and ending on the date of judgment, or for any shorter period therein,
if the court finds that the award of such interest for such period is just in
the circumstances. In determining whether an award of interest under this
section for any period is just in the circumstances, the court shall consider
only-
(1) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's repre-
sentative, made motions or asserted claims or defenses so lacking in
merit as to show that such party or representative acted intentionally for
delay, or otherwise acted in bad faith;
(2) whether, in the course of the action involved, such person or the oppos-
ing party, or either party's representative, violated any applicable rule,
statute, or court order providing for sanctions for dilatory behavior or
otherwise providing for expeditious proceedings; and
(3) whether such person or the opposing party, or either party's repre-
sentative, engaged in conduct primarily for the purpose of delaying the
litigation or increasing the cost thereof.
71. See Pro-Football, 528 F. Supp. at 1275 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1234, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980)); see also Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 561 (7th Cir. 1986).
72. Seven Gables Corp. v. Sterling Recreation Org. Co., 686 F. Supp. 1418, 1427
(W.D. Wash. 1988).
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Congress has expressly authorized the award of prejudgment inter-
est in antitrust actions, the exacting requirements of the amended
statute precludes such an award except in cases involving the most
egregious dilatory tactics.
2. Postjudgment Interest.-All prevailing plaintiffs, including
antitrust plaintiffs, are entitled to an award of interest on the amount
of the judgment.73 Postjudgment interest is mandatory,74 and its
purpose is to compensate the wronged party for being deprived of
the economic value of the damage award from the time of the award
to the payment of the money judgment.75
Before October 1, 1982, section 1961 provided that the state
law postjudgment interest rate determined the rate payable on
federal judgments. 6 However, as amended in April 1982,"7 section
1961 now establishes the postjudgment interest rate as the rate for
the last issue of fifty-two week Treasury bills settled immediately
prior to the entry of the judgment.78 The amended section 1961
retained the provision that the postjudgment interest rate would not
float, as it would be set and remain at the T-bill rate "settled im-
mediately prior to the date of the judgment."79  In essence, the
amended statute provided for a national postjudgment rate of in-
terest instead of varying state law interest rates.80
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
62 Stat. 957).
74. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1311
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 487
F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Michael Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 450
F.2d 875, 876 (1st Cir. 1971).
75. Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d 752, 756 (9th Cir. 1983); Kotsopoulos v.
Asturia Shipping Co., 467 F.2d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 1972).
76. Former § 1961 provided in pertinent part: "Such interest shall be calculated from
the date of the entry of the judgment, at the rate allowed by State law."
77. The amendment was made effective commencing October 1, 1982.
78. Amended § 1961 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil case recovered
in a district court. . . . Such interest shall be calculated from the date of
the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the coupon issue yield equivalent
(as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury) of the average accepted
auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week United States Treasury
bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment. ...
(b) Interest shall be computed daily to the date of payment and . . . shall be
compounded annually.
79. Campbell v. United States, 809 F.2d 563, 565, 573 (9th Cir. 1987).
80. Id. at 565.
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The Supreme Court has recently resolved a conflict among the
circuits by holding that the amendment to section 1961 does not
apply retroactively to money judgments entered before the
amended statute's October 1, 1982 effective date. Ruling in a mo-
nopolization action, the Court reasoned that the plain language of
both the original and amended statute clearly evinced Congress's
intent to apply the amended statute prospectively only and that
Congress delayed the effective date for six months so that courts
and attorneys could prepare for the change.8
The Court also held that postjudgment interest runs from
the date of the entry of judgment, not the date of the verdict. 2
The Court recognized that a delay in entry of judgment would
force the plaintiff to bear the loss of use of its money judgment
from verdict to judgment. However, the Court indicated that the
plain language of the statute and the lack of any expressly contrary
congressional intent compelled the result and further indicated that
the decision concerning the allocation of costs accruing from litiga-
tion was a matter for Congress, not the courts. 3
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed an often perplexing (and
frequently expensive) issue: from which judgment shall interest run
when more than one judgment has been entered in the same case?
The Court first focused on the purpose of postjudgment interest,
i.e., to compensate a successful plaintiff for being deprived of
compensation for the period between ascertainment of damages
and payment.84 The Court then analyzed the facts before it, noting
that the district court had determined on motion for new trial that
damages had not been supported by the evidence and that neither
party had appealed the court's ruling. 5 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court held that because damages had not been "ascertained" at the
time of the first judgment, postjudgment interest could only be cal-
culated from the entry of the second judgment.86 While disagree-
ing with the majority on its retroactivity ruling, the four dissenters
81. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1577-78 (1990).
82. Id. at 1575-76.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1576 (citing Poleto v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270, 1280 (3d
Cir. 1987)).
85. Kaiser Aluminum, 110 S. Ct. at 1576.
86. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 110 S. Ct. 1570, 1576 (1990).
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agreed with the "ascertainment" standard and likewise believed
that postjudgment interest should run from the second judgment.87
Under Kaiser Aluminum, postjudgment interest may not run
from the original judgment if plaintiff failed to prove damages
during the first trial. To hold otherwise would force a defendant
to compensate a plaintiff who has failed to prove that portion of
its case most crucial to an award of interest. A more difficult
question arises where the jury awards the plaintiff a damage ver-
dict; the district court agrees that damages have been proven but
orders a new trial on liability; and a second jury awards another
damage verdict, upon which judgment is entered. An even more
difficult question arises where a plaintiff proves its damages at the
first trial but the district court grants JNOV or, alternatively, a new
trial on liability issues; the court of appeals reverses and remands
for a new trial on an issue unrelated to proof of damages; and the
plaintiff receives a second damage judgment after the new trial.
In each example, damages were "ascertained" after the first trial;
however, one can argue that damages cannot truly be "ascertained"
if liability has not likewise been proven.
The dissent correctly pointed out that the Court's holding was
limited to its facts88 and posited a number of fact patterns com-
monly encountered by lower courts but not covered by the Court's
ruling.89 Clearly, several lower court rulings awarding interest
from the earlier of two judgments survive the Supreme Court's
ruling. First, where a district court enters judgment immediately
upon a jury's verdict, denies motions for JNOV and new trial, and
then enters a second judgment, postjudgment interest should run
from the initial judgment." Second, where a damage verdict and
judgment granted in plaintiff's favor is reversed by the district
court on motion for JNOV but reinstated by the court of appeals,
interest on remand should run from the pre-remand judgment.9
Third, where the district court remits a damage judgment or the
87. Id. at 1594.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See. e.g., Marshall v. Perez-Arzuaga, 866 F.2d 521, 522-25 (1st Cir. 1989).
91. See, e.g., Buck v. Burton, 768 F.2d 285, 287 (8th Cir. 1985); Maxey v.
Freightliner Corp., 727 F.2d 350, 351 (5th Cir. 1984); Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702
F.2d 752, 754-57 (9th Cir. 1983).
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court of appeals reduces it, with a new judgment entered after
post-trial motions or on remand, interest should run from the first
judgment-at least to the extent damages awarded in the first judg-
ment were awarded in the second judgment."2
Antitrust trials are frequently followed by post-trial motions
and appellate review, which often result in new trials and post-
remand proceedings. Interest on a large judgment rises sig-
nificantly when many months pass between filing of post-trial
motions and their resolution or many years pass between entry of
the original judgment and the court of appeals mandate or entry
of post-remand judgment. Thus, the issue of whether interest will
run from the earlier (or later) of the two judgments is of critical
importance. Kaiser Aluminum provides only a starting pointe on
the postjudgment interest question. The courts of appeals will be
left to apply the Supreme Court's "ascertainment" standard to the
myriad of multiple judgment cases that will surely continue to con-
front the lower courts.93
D. Application for Award of Attorney's Fees
1. Who is Entitled to Attorney's Fees.-Section 4 of the
Clayton Act provides for an award of attorney's fees as part of the
92. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 757 F.2d 734, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1985); Hand-
gards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1300 n.28 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1190 (1985); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672, 675-676 (9th Cir. 1973);
Lowe v. General Motors Corp., 527 F. Supp. 54, 57 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
93. The few lower courts that have addressed the question after Kaiser Aluminum
have reached divergent results. Tersely applying Kaiser, one court of appeals affirmed a
district court's denial of interest from a vacated damage judgment. Arthur S. Langenderfer,
Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1447 (6th Cir. 1990). However, several courts,
distinguishing Kaiser or relying on its dissent, or both, have awarded postjudgment in-
terest from the first of several judgments. See, e.g., Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922
F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1990) (where jury's initial liability determination upheld and adequate
evidentiary basis for initial damage award, interest awarded from first judgment); Boyd
v. Bulala, 751 F.Supp. 576, 578-84 (W.D. Va. 1990) (where first judgment "legally suf-
ficient," post-first judgment interest awarded); Keefe v. Bahama Cruise Lines, Inc., 753
F. Supp. 349 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (where issues addressed in first trial resolved in same
manner on remand and, specifically, where identical damages awarded, same result). Last-
ly, where a damage award was increased after remand, one court has awarded postjudg-
ment interest on the initial award from the date of the first judgment and on the difference
between the increased award and the initial award from the date of the second judgment.
McDevitt & Street Co. v. Marriott Corp., No. 88-0102-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 1991)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Currnt file).
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cost of suit in a successful antitrust damage action.94 The award
of attorney's fees to a successful antitrust plaintiff or counter-
claimant under Section 4 is mandatory,95 and one court of appeals
has held that, to establish an entitlement to a fee award, a plaintiff
need only prove antitrust injury rather than "prevailing party" status
as required by other fee-shifting statutes.96 The attorney's fee
provision is intended to insulate treble damage awards from expen-
ditures for legal fees, encourage private enforcement of the antitrust
laws, and penalize defendants for violating the antitrust laws.97
Similarly, Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides for reason-
able attorney's fees to an antitrust claimant who "substantially
prevails" in a proceeding for injunctive relief.98 Under Section 16,
a plaintiff need not ultimately prevail or obtain a final-judgment
to recover its attorney's fees; rather, it need only show a causal
relationship between the litigation and the practical outcome real-
ized.99 Thus, awards of attorney's fees have been held to be
appropriate both where a court denied a plaintiff's request for in-
junctive relief but the defendant voluntarily ceased its illegal con-
duct because of the pendency of the plaintiff's action, and where
94. 15 U.S.C. § 15 provides in pertinent part: "[A]ny person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ... shall
recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee."
95. United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 411
(2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 879
F.2d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 1989); Home Placement Serv., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co.,
819 F.2d 1199, 1210 (Ist Cir. 1987); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football
League, 505 F. Supp. 659, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified on other grounds, 670 F.2d
1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982). But cf. Litton Sys., Inc. v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785, 826-28 (2d Cir. 1983) (denying costs and attorney's fees
to a successful antitrust plaintiff as sanction for willfully concealing evidence), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
96. United States Football League, 887 F.2d at 412.
97. Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co. of Ga., 815 F.2d 1407, 1424 (11th
Cir. 1987); Twin City Sportservice v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1312
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 26 provides in pertinent part:
Any person ... shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief ... against
threatened loss or damages by a violation of the antitrust laws.... In any action
under this section in which the plaintiff substantially prevails, the court shall
award the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, to such plaintiff.
99. Southwest Marine v. Campbell Indus., 732 F.2d 744, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1984);
Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 533 F. Supp. 1385, 1387-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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a plaintiff did not obtain permanent injunctive relief because the
defendant abandoned its illegal conduct, but obtained preliminary
injunctive relief that effectively provided all necessary relief."E
Conversely, because of the potential chilling effect on private
enforcement and the lack of any reciprocal provision in Section 4,
a successful antitrust defendant may not recover its attorney's
fees. 10 However, where a plaintiff's antitrust suit is frivolous and
totally without merit, a prevailing antitrust defendant may recover
its attorney's fees as an award of sanctions under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.102
2. The Lodestar.--Once an entitlement has been established,
the benchmark for an attorney's fee award under Section 4 (and
other fee-shifting statutes) is that the fee award must be
"reasonable."'0 3  While the Supreme Court has not addressed the
question of reasonableness under Section 4, most courts of appeals
and district courts have used a two-part "hybrid" or "blended" ap-
proach in setting a reasonable antitrust fee award."4 Under this
standard, a court must first determine the "lodestar" amount, i.e.,
the dollar amount derived from multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.
The court then determines whether an adjustment to the lodestar-
either upward or downward-is necessary. 5
Time spent in pursuing a successful claim is, of course, com-
pensable. Moreover, a court will award fees for time spent on
100. Southwest Marine, 732 F.2d at 746-47; Grumman Corp., 533 F. Supp. at 1387-
89.
101. Byram Concretetanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649, 650-51
(3d Cir. 1967); Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l Bank, 435 F. Supp. 1307, 1327
(E.D. Wis. 1977), affd, 624 F.2d 788 (7th Cir. 1980).
102. Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 1987-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,774
at 59,188 (9th Cir. 1987); Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Integrated Resources, Inc.,
114 F.R.D. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
103. Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 982 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 562
(1986) ("Delaware Valley I")); see also United States Football League v. National Foot-
ball League, 887 F.2d 408, 411, 415 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990).
104. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 n.9 (1983); Moore v. Jas. H.
Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 838-40 (9th Cir. 1982); Seven Gables Corp. v. Sterling
Recreation Org. Co., 686 F. Supp. 1418, 1420 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
105. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 431; United States Football League, 887 F.2d at 413; Seven
Gables Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 1420; Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson, 684
F. Supp. 953, 956-57, 959 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
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unsuccessful claims that involved a common core of fact as, or a
legal theory related to, claims upon which the plaintiff achieved a
successful result. 6 Several courts have indicated that in pursuing
such claims "a prevailing antitrust plaintiff is entitled to recover
a reasonable attorney's fee for every item of service which, at the
time rendered, would have been undertaken by a reasonable and
prudent lawyer to advance or protect his client's interest in the
pursuit of a successful recovery of antitrust damages."' 7 Thus, the
Supreme Court has allowed recovery of time spent on appeal,0 8
and most courts have allowed compensation for time spent on peti-
tions for certiorari and retrial."°  In addition, while not beyond
dispute, most courts have awarded attorney's fees for time spent
preparing and litigating the question of the fee application itself."0
And to encourage the "cost-effective delivery of legal services,"
the Supreme Court and several courts of appeals in the antitrust
context have held that paralegal time is properly included in an
attorney's fee award."'
However, not all time spent is compensable. Courts will
review time records and eliminate "excessive, redundant or other-
wise unnecessary" hours from a fee award."' As alluded to
above,"' the Supreme Court and several courts have held that
hours worked on unsuccessful antitrust claims that are based on
106. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 980; United States Football League, 887 F.2d at 413-14
(both citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-36, and Texas State Teachers' Ass'n v. Garland
Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989)).
107. Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 879 F.2d 632, 638 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Pitchford
Scientific Instrument Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
108. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399 U.S. 222, 223 (1970).
109. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1263, 1274-75 (N.D. Cal. 1979);
Pitchford, 440 F. Supp. at 1178.
110. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1250 (7th Cir. 1982),
affd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 474 F.2d 549,
555 (9th Cir. 1973); Sun Publishing Co. v. Mecklenburg News, 594 F. Supp. 1512, 1523
(E.D. Va. 1984); Pitchford, 440 F. Supp. at 1179-80. But cf. Locklin v. Day-Glo Color
Corp., 378 F. Supp. 423, 429-30 (N.D. III. 1974).
111. Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2468-72 (1989); United States Football
League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 415-16 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990); Spray-Rite, 684 F.2d at 1250; Pacific Coast Agric. Export Ass'n
v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1210 n.19 (9th Cir. 1975).
112. Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 953, 957 (N.D. Ohio
1988) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)); Seven Gables Corp. v.
Sterling Recreation Org. Co., 686 F. Supp. 1418, 1421 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
113. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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different facts or legal theories than a successful claim should not
be compensated."' To help the court determine the number of
compensable hours, a fee applicant must submit evidence, usually
in the form of detailed time records, supporting the hours
worked."5
In determining the second component of the lodestar calcula-
tion, a reasonable hourly rate must be set. The hourly rate should
reflect the prevailing market rate for attorneys of comparable skill
and experience in the geographic area in which the litigation oc-
curs."6  Local (often lower) rates will apply, unless the fee ap-
plicant demonstrates that it was unable, through diligent and
good-faith efforts, to retain local counsel."7 Paralegal time will
be billed at either cost or the hourly market rates, depending on
the prevailing practice in the local community."' To compensate
for extended delay, inflation, and foregone interest, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a fee applicant may be entitled to an
award of fees based on their current value." 9 Courts have taken
delay into account by allowing compensation at current, as op-
posed to historical, rates'- or have suggested or utilized the more
complicated, but more accurate, method of adjusting historical
rates to present value.'
2'
3. Adjusting the Lodestar.-Having determined the "lodestar"
amount, a court must then decide whether an adjustment-either a
114. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35; United States Football League, 887 F.2d at 413.
115. Arthur S. Langenderfer, 684 F. Supp. at 957 (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433).
116. Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 982 (10th Cir. 1990); Ar-
thur S. Langenderfer, 684 F. Supp. at 958.
117. Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 953, 958 (N.D. Ohio
1988); see also Pacific W. Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 693 F. Supp. 865, 869 (E.D.
Cal. 1988).
118. United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 416
(2d Cir. 1989) (citing Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463, 2471-72 (1989)), cert. denied.
110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990).
119. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
716 (1987) ("Delaware Valley II").
120. Arthur S. Langenderfer, 684 F. Supp. at 958; Handgards, Inc. v..Ethicon, Inc.,
552 F. Supp. 820, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1982), affd, 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1983) In re
Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 395, 402 (D.D.C. 1978). But cf. Seven Gables
Corp. v. Sterling Recreation Org. Co., 686 F. Supp. 1418, 1421-22 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
121. See Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1081 (4th Cir. 1986); Gaines v. Dougherty,
775 F.2d 1565, 1572 (1lth Cir. 1985).
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reduction or an enhancement-is necessary.' In making this deter-
mination, courts will look to the factors set forth in Johnson v.
Georgia Highway Express, Inc.:1
23
(1) the time and labor required,
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved,
(3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly,
(4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due
to the acceptance of the case,
(5) the customary fee,
(6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent,
(7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circum-
stances,
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained,
(9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys,
(10) the "undesirability" of the case,
(11) the nature and length of the professional relationship
with the client, and
(12) awards in similar cases.
2 4
The Supreme Court has indicated that upward adjustments to
the lodestar are permitted in exceptional cases."z  However, the
Court has cautioned that the fee applicant must prove an upward
adjustment is necessary'26 and that the lodestar amount is presump-
tively reasonable." The Supreme Court and other courts have in-
dicated that most of the Johnson factors are subsumed in the
lodestar calculation in that "complexity of the case" and "skill of
122. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
563 (1986) ("Delaware Valley I"); United States Football League, 887 F.2d at 413;
Seven Gables Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 1420.
123. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
124. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 n.9 (1983); United States Football
League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 415 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 1116 (1990); Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 682 F.2d 830, 838-41 (9th Cir.
1982); Seven Gables Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 1420.
125. Delaware Valley I, 478 U.S. at 565 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-
901 (1984)).
126. Blum, 465 U.S. at 896, cited in Seven Gables Corp. v. Sterling Recreation Org.
Co., 686 F. Supp. 1418, 1423 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
127. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,
564 (1986) ("Delaware Valley I') (citing Blum, 465 U.S. at 897).
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counsel" are usually reflected in the hours expended and the
reasonable hourly rate." 8 Accordingly, the Supreme Court appears
to have limited the possibility of enhancement to two situations:
where exceptional results have been obtained 9 and where the risk
of nonpayment exists under a contingent fee arrangement.3
Under Delaware Valley 11, the fee applicant is entitled to a
contingency enhancement where it establishes that (1) rates of
compensation in the private market for contingency fee cases as a
class differ from those where counsel was paid, win or lose, on a
regular basis; and (2) without an adjustment for risk, the prevailing
party would have faced substantial difficulties in securing coun-
sel.' The Ninth Circuit has upheld a contingency enhancement
in a Robinson-Patman case based on a showing that competent
counsel would not take the case without the possibility of receiving
a fee enhancement reflecting a return beyond their normal hourly
rate.
32
Downward adjustments are likewise permissible, provided the
party seeking the reduction bears its burden of justifying the
reduced fee award. 3  Thus, courts of appeals have upheld district
court reductions of the lodestar where the plaintiffs achieved only
limited success as reflected by small or nominal damage awards."3
4. Contingent-Fee Arrangement.-An issue sometimes arises
regarding the effect of a contingent-fee arrangement on the amount
of an attorney's fee recovery. The Supreme Court and several
courts of appeals in antitrust cases have held that a contingent-fee
arrangement does not serve as a "cap" on the fee award; thus, if
128. Delaware Valley 1, 478 U.S. at 564-65; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 n.9; United
States Football League, 887 F.2d at 415.
129. Blum, 465 U.S. at 898-901; see also Seven Gables Corp., 686 F. Supp. at 1423
(results obtained not "sufficiently excellent" to justify enhancement).
130. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
729-30 (1987) ("Delaware Valley II"); id. at 731 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judg-
ment); id. at 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 730-31 (white, J.); id. at 731, 733-34 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at
747-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 879 F.2d 632, 636-37 (9th
Cir. 1989).
132. Hasbrouck, 879 F.2d at 636-37.
133. United States Football League v. National Football League, 887 F.2d 408, 413
(2d Cir. 1989) (citing Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 118 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1116 (1990).
134. Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1424 (lth Cir. 1989);
United States Football League, 887 F.2d at 413, 415.
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the statutory fee award exceeds the amount of fees available under
the agreement, the defendant must pay the higher amount.13 On
the other hand, if the statutory fee award is less than the contingent
fee, the defendant must pay the statutory fee and the plaintiff will
pay its attorneys the difference between the statutory fee and the
plaintiff's contingent debt.'36
5. Informal Resolution.-Attorney's fee applications under
Section 4 can involve amounts in controversy approaching or ex-
ceeding the underlying antitrust recovery. However, recent deci-
sions make clear that the halcyon days of double or triple lodestar
awards are over and that antitrust fee awards will not, except in
the rare case, provide successful antitrust claimants and their coun-
sel with a windfall.'37 Given the court's increasing reluctance to
grant enhanced fee awards and in order to maximize its client's fee
recovery, plaintiff's counsel should maintain accurate attorney and
paralegal time records, describing the amount of time spent on and
nature of each task performed. Defendant's counsel should educate
the court on the trend toward limiting fee awards to the lodestar
amount and should also challenge any fee application not adequate-
ly supported.
However, short of extensive fee application litigation, all
counsel should consider settling the fee issue informally or resolv-
ing the issue with minimal court intervention. Informal resolution
may benefit the defendant, because the plaintiff will eventually
charge each hour it spends litigating the fee issue to the defendant.
Likewise, assuming the parties can agree on the lodestar amount,
a successful plaintiff will not likely fare much better with the
court. Moreover, the district court itself will not relish the task
of reviewing time records and will be much more receptive to
resolving discrete legal issues raised by the fee application. To
facilitate informal resolution, time records-especially the
applicant's-should be exchanged. Counsel should also strive to
135. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989); Hasbrouck, 879 F.2d at 639;
Tic-X-Press, 815 F.2d at 1423-24. But cf. Pharr v. Housing Auth. of City of Prichard,
704 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (lth Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 718 (5th Cir. 1974).
136. Venegas v. Mitchell, 110 S. Ct. 1679(1990); Hamner v. Rios, 769 F.2d 1404,
1409 (9th Cir. 1985).
137. See supra notes 124-129 and accompanying text.
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agree on uncontested legal and factual issues, leaving only
legitimately contested issues for judicial resolution. Thus, infor-
mal resolution, while not always possible, should be seriously con-
sidered.
E. Application for Award of Costs
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that a person injured
in his business or property by a violation of the antitrust laws shall
be awarded "the cost of suit."'38 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d) provides, in turn, that "[e]xcept when express provision
therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party
unless the court otherwise directs." ''
The "express provisions" of Section 4 have been held to su-
persede a court's discretion to deny a successful plaintiff its costs
under Rule 54(d). 4 As such, an award of costs to a successful
antitrust plaintiff is mandatory. 4' Conversely, because Section 4
makes no express provision for award of costs to a prevailing an-
titrusf defendant, several courts have held that such award is dis-
cretionary and have denied costs to successful antitrust
defendants.'42 In exercising its discretion to deny costs, one court
has focused on several factors, including plaintiff's good faith in
bringing the action, the necessity of defendant's costs, the close-
ness and difficulty of the case, any benefits rendered to the defen-
dant, and the chilling effect that an award of costs might have on
small businesses in their enforcement of the antitrust laws.'
Once entitlement to costs has been established, courts must
next determine the scope of the cost award. Relying on the dif-
ference between "cost" under Section 4 and "costs" under Rule
54(d), one district court has allowed a successful antitrust litigant
138. 15 U.S.C. § 15.
139. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d).
140. White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 786 F.2d 728, 731 n.I
(6th Cir. 1986).
141. Lewis v. Pennington, 400 F.2d 806, 819 (6th Cir. 1968); Seven Gables Corp. v.
Sterling Recreation Org. Co., 686 F. Supp. 1418, 1423-24 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
142. White & White, 786 F.2d at 730-31; Lewis, 400 F.2d at 819. See also Associa-
tion of W. Ry. v. Riss & Co., 320 F.2d 785, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
143. White & White, 786 F.2d at 730-33.
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to recover not only court costs, but the entire "expense of prosecut-
ing the suit to a successful conclusion.""' However, most courts
do not distinguish between antitrust and other civil actions, holding
that the costs recoverable under Section 4 are limited to those costs
recoverable by a prevailing plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. section
1920.4 Under section 1920, the taxation of particular items of
costs'46 is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court,
but that discretion is not unfettered.'47 In applying section 1920
and Rule 54(d), a court must determine whether (1) the cost is
specifically recoverable under section 1920 and other cost-related
statutes, (2) the item of cost was reasonably necessary to the con-
duct of the litigation, and (3) the amount of the cost was reason-
able.'48 The recoverability of numerous items of costs has been
frequently litigated, with recent decisions focusing on expert's
costs, costs for computer-assisted legal research, and, to a lesser
extent, costs for extra document workers.
In Crawford Fitting v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc.,49 the Supreme Court
held that a federal court may not tax expert witness fees beyond
144. Pitchford Scientific Instrument Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1175, 1179
(W.D. Pa. 1977); see also Refuse & Envtl. Sys. v. Industrial Servs. of Am., 732 F. Supp.
1209, 1220-21 (D. Mass. 1990).
145. Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co., 518 F.2d 1143, 1149 (6th Cir. 1975); Twen-
tieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190, 223-24 (9th Cir. 1964); Arthur
S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 953, 960 (N.D. Ohio 1988); see also
Royal Crown Cola Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 678 F. Supp. 875 (M.D. Ga. 1987).
146. Section 1920 provides:
A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshall;
(2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript
necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in
the case;
(5) Docket fees under Section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters and
salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under Section
1828 of this title.
A bill of cost shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the
judgment or decree.
147. Weihaupt v. American Medical Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 430 (7th Cir. 1989);
Guinasso v. Pacific First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 100 F.R.D. 264, 265 (D. Or. 1983).
148. Illinois v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 657 F.2d 855, 864 (7th Cir. 1981); Arthur S.
Langenderfer, 684 F. Supp. at 960.
149. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
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the statutory thirty dollars per diem limits contained in 28 U.S.C.
sections 1821 and 1920." The vast majority of pre- and post-
Crawford Fitting decisions have likewise held that expert fees ex-
ceeding thirty dollars per trial day may not be awarded as part of
the "cost" of suit under Section 4."'5 Some courts have allowed
recovery for the cost of computer-assisted legal research-either
under the theory that the costs recoverable in an antitrust action
exceed costs recoverable in other civil litigation'52 or under the
now-discredited notion that a district court may award expenses
not specifically recoverable under section 1920.' However, ther
is now persuasive authority refusing to allow recovery of com-
puter-assisted legal research as an item of costs because it is not
specifically included in section 1920 and because those expenses
should be absorbed by attorneys' overhead and fees.'54 Finally,
while not pointing to any statutory basis for doing so, one court
has indicated that the expense of hiring extra document workers
for a single case may be taxed as costs, but the ongoing cost of
secretarial employees performing the same task may not.'55
Antitrust actions may require significant outlays of cost. Par-
ties must frequently retain expert accountants to address liability
issues, including cost and pricing, as well as damage issues, in-
cluding calculation of lost profits and lost going-concern value.
Similarly, expert economists will often be called upon to justify
or discredit a party's business practices. Assuming experts must
be retained, Crawford Fitting renders the single largest item of
150. Id. at 439, 441.
151. See, e.g., Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 980-81 (10th
Cir. 1990); Barber & Ross Co. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., 810 F.2d 1276, 1282 (4th Cir.
1987); Seven Gables Corp. v. Sterling Recreation Org. Co., 686 F. Supp. 1418, 1421
(W.D. Wash. 1988); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson, 684 F. Supp. 953,
960-62 (N.D. Ohio 1988). But see Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 258, 268
(E.D. Wash. 1986), aff d in part and rev'd in Part on other grounds, 879 F.2d 632 (9th
Cir. 1989).
152. Pitchford Scientific Instrument Corp. v. Pepi, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1175, 1178-79
(W.D. Pa. 1977).
153. Independence Tube Corp. v. Copperwell Corp., 543 F. Supp. 706, 723 (N.D. Il.
1982).
154. Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 309 n.75 (2d Cir. 1979);
Arthur S. Langenderfer, 684 F. Supp. at 961; Ortega v. City of Kansas City, Kan., 659
F. Supp. 1201, 1219 (D. Kan. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1497 (10th Cir.
1989); Litton Sys. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 613 F. Supp. 824, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
155. Hasbrouck, 631 F. Supp. at 268-69.
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trial expense essentially unrecoverable and further indicates that,
absent a clear statement by Congress, recoverable cost items will
be limited to those set forth in section 1920. Accordingly, an-
titrust counsel and, in particular, plaintiff's contingent fee counsel
should strike definitive arrangements with their clients concerning
the payment of expert's fees. More generally, an understanding
of which items of costs will not be recoverable will be crucial in
determining how an antitrust action should be financed.
IV. Conclusion
This Article has attempted to provide a guideline to and over-
view of post-trial motion practice in private antitrust cases brought
in federal court. To that end, it has focused on the full array of
post-trial motions, including those that may affect the jury's ver-
dict and those that have an impact on the size of an antitrust judg-
ment. Because of the high stakes and complex legal and factual
issues involved in most antitrust actions, a solid working
knowledge of the law governing post-trial motions is indispensable
to the antitrust practitioner.
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